Post-entry generic price and annual drug cost

Applies a proportional price reduction associated with a given number of generic competitors to the brand price before entry, then multiplies by the doses used in a year. This is the simplest way to reflect generic entry in a cost-effectiveness model, and it assumes immediate and complete switching at a single reduction.

Signature

P_g = P_b * (1 - k); C_ann = P_b * (1 - k) * N_d
Inputs
InputsDefinitionUnit
P_bBrand price per dose in the period before generic entry, at the same price level as the reductiondollars per dose
kReduction in price relative to the pre-entry brand price, at least 0 and at most 1proportion
N_dNumber of doses used by one patient in a yeardoses per year
Output
P_gModelled price per dose once generics have entereddollars per dose
C_annModelled acquisition cost per patient per year after entrydollars per patient per year

Function

Average bioequivalence and generic price function

For an ANDA, bioequivalence to the reference listed drug is shown when the 90% confidence interval for the ratio of geometric means of a pharmacokinetic measure, such as AUC or Cmax, lies within 80.00% to 125.00% after rounding. The interval is computed on the log scale and exponentiated. For economic models, the approval of generic competitors is then translated into a post-entry price.

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Implementations

  • Excel

    Post-entry price and annual cost

    With the brand price in BrandPrice, the reduction in PriceReduction and the doses a year in DosesPerYear, the formulas return the generic price and the annual cost.

    =BrandPrice*(1-PriceReduction); =BrandPrice*(1-PriceReduction)*DosesPerYear

Assumptions

  • Price level of the reduction matches the price used

    The FDA reductions measured with average manufacturer prices apply to manufacturer-level prices; the invoice-price reductions apply to pharmacy purchase prices. The reduction and the brand price come from the same level.

  • Immediate and complete switching

    Every dose switches to the generic when it enters and the reduction applies from that date. In practice some use stays with the brand, entrants arrive over time and the timing depends on patent challenges, the 30-month stay and 180-day exclusivity.

Worked examples

  • Four generic competitors at manufacturer prices

    Using the article's example, a brand costing 10 dollars a daily dose meets four generic competitors, a median AMP reduction of 79% in the FDA analysis. The generic price is 2.10 dollars a dose and the annual cost 766.50 dollars, against 3,650 before entry.

    P_b = 10; k = 0.79; N_d = 365; P_g = 2.10; C_ann = 766.50
  • One generic competitor at manufacturer prices

    With a single generic producer the median AMP reduction was 39%, giving 6.10 dollars a dose and 2,226.50 dollars a year.

    P_b = 10; k = 0.39; N_d = 365; P_g = 6.10; C_ann = 2226.50

Common errors

  • Applying a manufacturer-level reduction to pharmacy prices

    The 79% reduction is measured on average manufacturer prices, which exclude wholesaler mark-ups. For pharmacy purchase prices the FDA analysis reports 73% with four competitors.

  • Treating median reductions as a forecast for one drug

    The FDA figures are medians across products with first generic entry between 2015 and 2017 and do not predict the path for a particular drug or for another country's prices.

Sources

  • FDA analysis of generic competition and prices

    Conrad R, Lutter R. Generic competition and drug prices: new evidence linking greater generic competition and lower generic drug prices. Silver Spring, MD: US Food and Drug Administration; December 2019. Median generic-to-brand price ratios for drugs with initial generic entry from 2015 to 2017, relative to the brand price in the three months before entry: reductions of 39% (AMP) and 31% (invoice) with one producer, 54% and 44% with two, 79% and 73% with four, and more than 95% with six or more.

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