Implicit cross-subsidy per member under community rating

The community-rated premium minus a member's expected cost. A positive value is the amount a member pays above expected cost towards others, as low-risk members do; a negative value is the amount by which a high-risk member's expected cost exceeds the premium. Weighted by the number of members, the cross-subsidies sum to zero across the pool, because the premium equals the pool's mean expected cost. Read from the insurer's side, the same quantity is the expected profit on that member in HE-FM-CSKM-001.

Signature

s_i = P - c_i
Inputs
InputsDefinitionUnit
PCommunity-rated premium of the pool, from HE-FM-CRAT-001£ per member per year
c_iExpected annual cost of care for a member of risk group i£ per member per year
Output
s_iCross-subsidy paid, when positive, or received, when negative, by each member of risk group i£ per member per year

Function

Community-rated premium, cross-subsidy and risk equalisation function

Maps the number of members and the expected annual cost of each risk group in a community-rated pool to the single premium every member pays, the implicit cross-subsidy each group gives or receives, the risk equalisation transfers that offset those cross-subsidies for insurers, and the late-entry loadings that Ireland and Australia add to the premium of people who first buy cover when older. The same difference between payment and expected cost, read from the insurer's side, is the expected profit per member on the Cream Skimming page (HE-FM-CSKM-001).

Try this function

Implementations

  • Excel

    Community-rating cross-subsidy per member in one Excel cell

    With the premium in a cell named Premium and a group's expected cost in a cell named ExpectedCost, Excel returns the cross-subsidy per member of that group.

    =Premium-ExpectedCost

Assumptions

  • Premium set at the pool's mean expected cost for the cross-subsidy

    P comes from HE-FM-CRAT-001 for the same members. If the premium includes loadings for administration and profit, they are removed first so that the cross-subsidies balance.

  • Expected, not realised, costs in the community-rating cross-subsidy

    The cross-subsidy concerns predictable differences in expected cost between risk groups. Differences in realised costs within a group are the unpredictable risk that risk pooling spreads in any case.

Worked examples

  • Cross-subsidy paid by a low-risk member of the article's pool

    At the article's premium of £2,000 each low-risk member, expected to cost £1,000, pays £1,000 more than their expected cost.

    P = 2000; c_i = 1000; s_i = 1000
  • Cross-subsidy received by a high-risk member of the article's pool

    Each high-risk member, expected to cost £6,000, pays £4,000 less than their expected cost. The total paid, 800 × 1,000 = 800,000, equals the total received, 200 × 4,000 = 800,000, so the pool balances.

    P = 2000; c_i = 6000; s_i = -4000
  • Cross-subsidy paid by a low-risk member after the low-risk exit

    At the post-exit premium of £3,000 each remaining low-risk member pays £2,000 above expected cost, computed here for illustration, which is the stronger reason to leave that the article describes.

    P = 3000; c_i = 1000; s_i = 2000

Common errors

  • Treating the community-rating cross-subsidy as risk pooling

    Risk pooling spreads unpredictable costs among members with similar risks. The £1,000 a year paid by each low-risk member in the article's example is predictable from the start and is a transfer between groups, which is why low-risk members have a reason to leave when buying cover is voluntary.

  • Measuring the community-rating cross-subsidy against a loaded premium

    If loadings for administration and profit stay in the premium, every group appears to pay a positive amount and the cross-subsidies no longer sum to zero. The loadings are removed before the cross-subsidy is computed.

Sources

  • Low risks overpriced and high risks underpriced under a ban on premium differentiation

    van de Ven WPMM, Hamstra G, van Kleef RC, Reuser M, Stam PJA. The goal of risk equalization in regulated competitive health insurance markets. European Journal of Health Economics. 2023;24(1):111-123. Sections on regulation-induced problems and on risk selection, which state that with a ban on premium differentiation the low-risk insured are overpriced and the high-risk insured underpriced, so that high-risk people generate a predictable loss for insurers and low-risk people a predictable gain.

    View source →

Canonical Identity

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