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Probability

Probability is a number between zero and one assigned to the likelihood of a precisely defined event under stated conditions.

Last reviewed byDr Darrin Baines

Concept Architecture

Probability: Concept Architecture

Orientation and learning roadmap

The page begins with events and the rules that keep their numerical assignments coherent. It then shows how conditioning changes the reference group, works through a diagnostic-testing example, and explains how probabilities enter health decision models without being confused with uncertainty about an estimate.

Define the event, population, and time period

A numerical probability is interpretable only when the event and its conditions are stated. For example, “death” is not a sufficiently specified model input, whereas death within one year among patients starting a defined treatment in a stated population is closer to one. The population, starting state, follow-up duration, competing events, and data source determine whether a reported probability applies to the decision at hand.

A probability model assigns values to events in a sample space of possible outcomes. Its basic rules require every event probability to lie from zero to one, the probability of the whole sample space to equal one, and probabilities of mutually exclusive events to add. These rules make calculations internally consistent; they do not guarantee that an estimated input is empirically credible.

For an event AA and its complement AcA^c:

0≤P(A)≤1,P(Ac)=1−P(A).0\leq P(A)\leq1,\qquad P(A^c)=1-P(A).

The probability can be written as a proportion or percentage, but the scale must be explicit. A value of 0.20 is 20%, not 0.20%, and does not say whether the event happens exactly once, at least once, or by a particular time unless the event has been defined that way.

Combine and condition events correctly

“And” refers to the intersection of events, while “or” refers to their union. Two outcomes can sometimes occur together, so adding their probabilities without accounting for their overlap double counts that overlap. Conditional probability changes the denominator to the group for whom the condition is true.

P(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B)−P(A∩B),P(A\cup B)=P(A)+P(B)-P(A\cap B),

P(A∣B)=P(A∩B)P(B)when P(B)>0.P(A\mid B)=\frac{P(A\cap B)}{P(B)}\quad\text{when }P(B)>0.

If AA and BB are mutually exclusive, their intersection has probability zero and the addition rule simplifies. Independence is different: it means P(A∣B)=P(A)P(A\mid B)=P(A) when P(B)>0P(B)>0, or equivalently P(A∩B)=P(A)P(B)P(A\cap B)=P(A)P(B). Mutually exclusive nonzero-probability events cannot be independent, since learning that one occurred rules out the other.

A worked diagnostic-testing example

A positive test does not have the same probability as the disease among people with a positive result. One is a test result conditional on disease status; the other reverses the condition and depends on the disease prevalence in the tested population. Bayes' rule and the total-probability rule keep those denominators explicit.

Suppose 10% of a population has a condition, test sensitivity is 80%, and specificity is 90%. Among 1,000 people, the illustrative expected counts are 100 with the condition and 900 without it; 80 of the first group test positive and 90 of the second group test positive. The resulting positive predictive value is:

P(condition∣positive)=0.80(0.10)0.80(0.10)+0.10(0.90)=80170≈0.471.P(\text{condition}\mid\text{positive})=\frac{0.80(0.10)}{0.80(0.10)+0.10(0.90)}=\frac{80}{170}\approx0.471.

GroupExpected numberPositive results
Condition present10080 true positives
Condition absent90090 false positives
Total1,000170 positives

Thus about 47.1% of positive tests come from people with the condition under these illustrative inputs. The 80% sensitivity is P(positive∣condition)P(\text{positive}\mid\text{condition}), which answers a different question. These are expected counts, not observed trial data, and the result would change with prevalence or test performance in the actual population.

Use probabilities in health models

Decision trees assign branch probabilities to possible outcomes from the same chance node. Exhaustive, mutually exclusive branches should sum to one; otherwise the expected value from the branches will be misweighted. A state-transition model similarly uses cycle-specific probabilities for movement among defined health states, with each row of a transition matrix summing to one when the states exhaust the next-cycle possibilities.

A probability for a specified event and time interval is distinct from a rate or hazard that describes event occurrence per unit of time. Under a constant hazard hh over an interval of length tt, the event probability is 1−exp⁡(−ht)1-\exp(-ht), subject to the assumed hazard process and competing-event structure. Substituting a rate directly for a cycle probability without checking units and assumptions can yield invalid model inputs.

Empirical proportions can estimate probabilities, but their applicability depends on the sampling frame, missing data, event definitions, and follow-up. In a decision model, uncertainty about an estimated probability may be represented with an appropriate parameter distribution for probabilistic sensitivity analysis. That distribution reflects uncertainty about the input; a single draw from it is not the same as the event probability itself.

Check the model's numerical and clinical meaning

A probability can be mathematically valid yet clinically implausible for the proposed population. Validation therefore includes both arithmetic constraints and a comparison with relevant evidence and expert understanding. Decisions should be examined across plausible uncertainty in influential probabilities rather than reported from a single unqualified estimate.

  1. State the event and conditioning set. Identify the population, starting state, time horizon, comparator, and any risk factors or prior observations that define the probability.
  2. Check the numerical rules. Keep values between zero and one and confirm that exhaustive, mutually exclusive model branches sum to one.
  3. Match evidence to use. Examine source population, endpoint definition, follow-up, and transportability to the intended decision.
  4. Preserve dependence. Avoid multiplying probabilities as if events were independent when shared causes or conditional relationships matter.
  5. Propagate input uncertainty. Test plausible ranges and correlations, and report whether the preferred decision changes.

The appropriate probability is conditional on a well-defined question, not a universal property of a treatment or diagnosis. When evidence supports several plausible estimates, the model should show how those alternatives affect outcomes and decisions.

Evidence used for this explanation

The MIT materials establish the probability axioms, event rules, conditioning, and Bayes' rule used in the calculations. ISPOR-SMDM guidance connects parameter estimation and uncertainty analysis to transparent health decision modeling.

Library

Publications

1
  • Journal article

    Parameter Estimation and Uncertainty: A Report of the ISPOR-SMDM Modeling Good Research Practices Task Force-6 — Briggs, Weinstein, Fenwick, Karnon, Sculpher & Paltiel, Task Force Report 6 ed., 2012 (Value in Health / Medical Decision Making)

    Best-practice guidance on parameter estimation and the characterisation of uncertainty in decision models, covering probabilistic sensitivity analysis, distributional choices, and correlation between parameters.

Frequently Asked Questions (6)

  • What is probability?

    A numerical measure, ranging from zero to one, expressing the likelihood that a specific event will occur.

    Source: Kolmogorov 1933

  • How do the frequentist and Bayesian views of probability differ?

    There are two main ways of understanding what a probability means. The frequentist view treats it as the long-run proportion of times an event occurs in many repetitions, so it applies to repeatable events. The Bayesian view treats it as a degree of belief about a proposition, which can apply even to one-off events or unknown fixed quantities. The two lead to different methods of analysis, though both obey the same mathematical rules. Which is appropriate depends on the question. Hacking (2001) discusses these interpretations.

    Source: Hacking 2001

  • What are the axioms of probability?

    The axioms of probability, set out by Kolmogorov, state that the probability of any event is a non-negative number; that the probability of the certain event, that some outcome occurs, is one; and that for mutually exclusive events, the probability that any of them occurs is the sum of their individual probabilities. From these three axioms, the rules of probability are derived. They provide a rigorous mathematical foundation for probability, ensuring that probabilities are consistent and can be manipulated by well-defined rules.

    Source: Kolmogorov 1933

  • How are probabilities interpreted?

    Probabilities are interpreted in more than one way. The frequentist interpretation treats a probability as the long-run relative frequency of an event over many repetitions. The Bayesian, or subjective, interpretation treats it as a degree of belief about an event, which can be updated with evidence. Both use the same mathematical rules but differ in meaning. The interpretation affects how probabilities are estimated and used, though the axioms and rules of probability apply regardless of which interpretation is adopted.

    Source: Bayes 1763

  • What are the basic rules of probability?

    The basic rules of probability include the addition rule, that the probability of either of two mutually exclusive events is the sum of their probabilities; the multiplication rule, that the probability of two events both occurring is the probability of one times the conditional probability of the other; and the complement rule, that the probability of an event not occurring is one minus its probability. These rules, following from the axioms, allow probabilities of combined and related events to be calculated consistently.

    Source: Kolmogorov 1933

  • Why is probability important in health economics?

    Probability is important in health economics because outcomes are uncertain, and probability provides the means to quantify and reason about that uncertainty. Event probabilities drive decision-analytic models, transition probabilities move patients through Markov models, and the probability of outcomes underlies expected values and cost-effectiveness. Probability also underpins the representation of parameter uncertainty in probabilistic sensitivity analysis. As the mathematics of uncertainty, probability is fundamental to modelling, evaluation, and decision making under the uncertainty that pervades health care.

    Source: Kolmogorov 1933

Trust Record

Verified by Dr Darrin Baines

British health economist

Professional identity: darrinbaines.org

Verification date: 25 Sep 2026

Content version: 1.0.0

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HE-EM-MP-034
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